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The evolution of employers’ organisations in the United Kingdom: Extending 
countervailing power 
  
The concept of countervailing power has been used to suggest that the power of unions explains 
the origins and development of employers’ organisations (EOs). However, unions have 
declined since the 1970s but EOs continue to play an important role in employment relations. 
If pressure from unions is not sufficient to explain continuing employer organisation, what does 
account for it? This article pursues this question by examining the evolution and activity of UK 
EOs between the 1960s and 2016. Our countervailing power argument goes beyond a sole 
focus on unions to include changing pressures and demands on EOs caused by the state such 
as individual rights legislation, and campaigns by civil society organisations. The changing 
force exerted by these societal pressures helps to explain the shift of EOs’ focus from collective 
bargaining, nowadays only pursued by a minority of EOs, to lobbying, provision of services, 
legal support and training.  
 
Journal keywords: employers’ organizations, collective bargaining, employment relationship, 
collectivism, employers’ association, employer forum 
Keywords – methodological: longitudinal research; qualitative research methods 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The evolution of employers’ organisations (EOs) is closely intertwined with that of unions. In 
the early stages of industrialization, employers founded EOs to countervail union power as is 
well-established in the literature (Phelps Brown, 1959; Slate, 1957). However, EOs continued 
to play a significant role in employment relations (ER) in a number of countries despite 
declining union membership (Behrens, 2004; Gooberman, Hauptmeier and Heery 2017a,b;  
Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 1999). This suggests that countervailing union power is not 
sufficient in itself to explain continuing employer organisation. How then can the evolution of 
employer organisation and activity be explained? This article pursues this question by 
examining UK EOs between the 1960s and 2016.  
 
In the 1960s and 1970s EOs bargained collectively with unions and such arrangements covered 
most of the British workforce (Armstrong, 1984). EOs also took part in the governance of ER 
and the wider economy through tripartite bodies in areas such as training and workplace 
conflict (Crouch, 1978). However, unions declined during the Thatcher Governments after 
1979 and an increasing number of employers withdrew from collective bargaining (Purcell, 
1995). EOs gradually broadened their services and their most prominent activity became 
representing employer interests in the political process, although EOs also assisted employers 
to deal with new challenges in managing employees. Organisational changes included mergers 
of EOs (Grant and Marsh, 1977), a focus on regional employer representation in the context of 
devolution and the foundation of a new type of EO, the employer forum (EF). EFs’ assisted 
members with the implementation of individual rights legislation and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) through raising standards within their business operations. Given that 
many employer bodies no longer bargain collectively, a narrow focus on employers’ 
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associations would not have captured this new employer collective action. Thus, the article 
casts a wider net to examine membership-based EOs active in the areas of work, ER and Human 
Resource Management (HRM).  
 
In explaining the changes in employer organisation and activity, our argument builds on 
previous countervailing power arguments (Barry and Wilkinson, 2011; Galbraith, 1952; Zhu 
and Nyland, 2016) and extends them beyond unions to include new pressures by the state and 
civil society organisations (CSOs), including non-governmental organisations and identity 
groups. Countering unions was the initial focus for EOs but when union power waned, new 
and additional pressures on employers emerged. These pressures included individual rights 
such as those inscribed within equality opportunity laws and minimum work standards, as well 
as campaigns from CSOs that targeted deficient labour standards. EOs responded to these new 
challenges and risks by changing their foci of activity, service provision and organisational 
forms.  
 
This article makes two contributions to the literature. First, studies of changing ER in the UK 
(e.g. Brown, Bryson, and Forth, 2009) tend to subsume the study of EOs within that unions and 
collective bargaining. This article is the first empirical study that longitudinally traces EOs’ 
activities and organisational forms. Second, our extension of countervailing power highlights 
how societal and regulatory pressures have changed over time, as has the need and impetus for 
employer organisation.  
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EXTENDING COUNTERVAILING POWER 
 
Countervailing power is a well-established concept in ER (Plowman, 1984; Barry and 
Wilkinson, 2011; Zhu and Nyland, 2016) and has been used to describe how employers 
founded EOs to counter and supress unions (Derber, 1984). When such attempts failed, 
employers offered unions a quid-pro-quo to limit their influence. EOs recognised unions and 
accepted the negotiation of working conditions and pay through collective bargaining, while 
unions accepted the right of employers to manage the workplace (Sisson, 1987). Unions and 
EOs often voluntarily developed this type of procedural approach to managing conflict within 
ER (Armstrong, 1984). States institutionalized ER and defined the role of EOs to a greater 
degree in the decades following World War II (Windmuller and Gladstone, 1984; Howell, 
2005). Unions reached the apex of their power in this period and were able to whipsaw 
employers under conditions of expanding national markets. Individual employers sought 
protection from these pressures through multi-employer collective bargaining (Sisson, 1987), 
although it could still happen that company-level labour representatives pushed for wage levels 
that exceeded outcomes of sectoral collective bargaining agreements (Gospel, 1992). As 
market conditions changed from the 1970s, becoming more international and competitive, 
unions lost power and the need for employers to counter union action through collective 
bargaining decreased.  
 
While the focus on unions and the state’s support of institutional ER has some merits in 
explaining the origins and development of EOs (McIvor, 1996; Sisson, 1987) it does not fully 
explain more recent developments. Barry and Wilkinson (2011) reconceptualise Galbraith’s 
original countervailing power argument for the current economic environment. They identify 
three preconditions that enable countervailing power to be applied to contemporary employer 
5 
 
organisation. The first precondition is competitive (rather than oligopolistic) markets with a 
large number of diverse firms, forcing EOs to develop renewal strategies to retain members 
(Sheldon et al., 2016). The second is the continuing capacity of employees to use market power 
against employers (at least in some markets). The final precondition is decentralised bargaining 
within which EOs seek to persuade the state to countervail employee power by limiting 
collective worker rights. This state agency in curtailing labour and collective bargaining rights 
took place in many countries (Blyth 2002; Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 1999). It has further 
impacted the power balance between EOs and unions in addition to the economic changes 
mentioned above.  
 
However, two extensions of the countervailing power perspective have yet to be considered: 
the impact of individual employment rights legislation, and CSOs, on individual employers 
and EOs. In relation to the first extension, different strands of individual rights legislation exist. 
These include equal opportunity or antidiscrimination laws, minimum working standards and 
work related social benefits (in addition, involvement and participation rights in the areas of 
redundancy and health and safety often tend to be a combination of individual and collective 
rights). While individual rights legislation has long existed, as in Australia where the first 
minimum wage laws were introduced in the late 19th century, states have developed a greater 
focus on individual rights in the wake of the decline of collective bargaining (Piore and Safford, 
2006).  
 
Centre left governments such as the Labour Government in the UK from 1997 sought a third 
way between the deregulatory culling of worker rights and corporatist labour markets (Howell, 
2004). Such governments introduced or strengthened minimum standards to introduce a floor 
in the labour market under which standards were not to fall; while social benefits focussed on 
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welfare to work programmes (Greer et al., 2017). Governments also introduced equal rights 
legislation or extended existing acts. These laws were Janus-faced, aiming to protect employees 
while enabling groups of workers to compete in the market on a level playing field 
(Hauptmeier, 2011). A further impetus came from international organisations such as the 
International Labour Organisation and the European Union (EU) although rights were 
implemented unevenly across nation states.  
 
Employers initially saw the individual rights agenda as a threat to profitability as new norms 
might create rigid work practices. In addition, equal opportunities laws were often articulated 
in ambiguous and open-ended terms (Dobbin, 2009), causing uncertainty amongst employers. 
Various employer responses to the new pressures could be observed. Employers engaged in 
lobbying and either sought to prevent new or dilute existing legislation (Howell, 2004). Some 
employers opposed new legislation after its introduction, but others propagated the commercial 
advantages of diversity management and went beyond minimum compliance (Dobbin, 2009). 
This article explores the role of EOs in responding to the individual rights agenda.  
 
The second extension of countervailing power is the impact of CSOs on EOs (Heery, Abbott, 
and Williams, 2012). The role and impact of CSOs is closely related to the individual rights 
agenda discussed above. Piore and Safford (2006) observed how the partial replacement of 
collective ER with an employment rights regime was caused by shifting axes of political and 
social mobilisation away from class, industry and occupation towards identities rooted outside 
the workplace such as race, ethnicity, disability and sexual orientation. They describe how 
identity groups mobilised equal opportunity rights within the workplace, requiring new 
instruments and approaches for managing ER.  
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CSOs campaign in different ways. They seek to positively promote working conditions or 
social outcomes for groups of workers, including low wage workers, older workers, disabled 
or immigrants (Luce, 2004; Heery, Abbott, and Williams, 2012). However, CSOs also directly 
target rogue corporate behaviour and employer abuse of the type targeted by the anti-sweatshop 
movement within the garment industry. CSOs’ positive and negative campaigning seeks to 
exploit the brand and image sensitivity of companies in consumer markets. Employers seek to 
avoid negative publicity and consumer wrath by curbing labour rights violations; while 
simultaneously presenting themselves as a good employer to consumers by adapting CSR 
strategies and improving working conditions. Other employers sought to countervail such 
pressures by joining EFs as elaborated below.  
 
In plea to develop the literature on EOs further, Barry and Wilkinson (2011) urge inquiry into 
‘what role [EOs] continue to play, and whether they have also needed to revise their functions 
and activities in relation to other types of pressures’ (p. 158). This article pursues this agenda 
by examining the changing role, function and activities of collective employer organisation 
through a countervailing power perspective, focussing on the state’s expansion of individual 
workplace rights and the increasing importance of CSOs.  
 
METHODS AND DATA 
 
We examine the evolution of EOs in the UK across two periods, from 1964 to 1979 during the 
heyday of corporatism, and from 1979 to 2016 when collective regulation declined and the 
salience of individual rights increased. We use empirical data to map the forms and activities 
of EOs as well as the actors that influenced them: unions, CSOs and state (see Table 1 for an 
overview of UK governments over time).  
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Table 1 about here  
 
While governments held broad lists of EOs prior to the 1970s, the only official source of 
detailed time-series data are the government’s Certification Office. However, data were not 
collected before 1976 and subsequent data include only those EOs active within collective 
bargaining. Time-series are similarly missing from the literature on UK ER, while the rare 
surveys (e.g. Brown, 1981) are neither comprehensive nor comparable.  
 
We therefore used a range of qualitative and quantitative data as well as previous literature to 
assemble our account, triangulate our findings and outline the contemporary incidence of 
employer collective action in the UK. First, we consulted EO websites in 2014-15 to populate 
a database comprising all UK EOs, with more than 60 data points for each EO across categories 
comprising: general information; governance; activities and services, and; relationships to 
government and other organisations. By broadening the definition of employer collective 
organisations beyond only those organisations that bargain collectively, our database captures 
membership-based EOs active across work, ER and HRM. We identified 447 EOs pursuing a 
wide range of activities such as collective bargaining, training, advice on HRM practices, 
support for selection and recruitment, arbitration, legal advice on employment and labour 
matters, representation in employment tribunals and political representation. 
 
Second, we conducted 98 semi-structured interviews between 2013 and 2017 with 
representatives from EOs (63), unions (13), government (5), CSOs (6), member firms (5) and 
six experts with knowledge of EOs (for example, representatives of the Advisory, Conciliation 
and Arbitration Service [Acas]). Interviews were carried out with representatives from across 
the range of UK EOs, including regional EOs, general national EOs, sectoral-national EOs and 
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EOs focused on an issue-specific policy agenda. In the first stage we used snowball sampling, 
whereby initial interviewees suggested subsequent interviewees. Many interviewees had 
significant historical knowledge gained over long careers, and our questioning sought to draw 
out their experience. 
 
Third, further historical evidence was available from data deposited by governmental 
organisations at the National Archives. For example, Certification Office data present in the 
National Archive include annual reports as well as data on individual EOs that registered with 
the office, while data from other bodies included submissions to government commissions and 
internal working papers.  
 
CORPORATIST GOVERNANCE AND SECTORAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, 
1960s-1979 
 
Employer organisation and activity  
 
The most important EO activity in the 1960s was representing employer interests within 
national multi-employer bargaining structures. For example, the National Joint Council in the 
ceramics industry negotiated and implemented an agreement that was ‘intrusive’ where ‘every 
employer was held to the book by the union’ (interview with representative of British Ceramics 
Confederation, 20.11.2013). However, sectoral collective bargaining became less important for 
EOs due to the growing incidence of plant-level bargaining. Employers sometimes withdrew 
from national agreements and terminated their membership of EOs, contributing to the 
development of a two-tier bargaining system. The national agreement provided minimum 
conditions which local negotiators supplemented at workplace-level, an approach taken by 20 
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out of 24 EOs surveyed in 1966 (Clegg, 1979). EOs also took part in the governance of tripartite 
bodies such as: Wages Councils that set industry-specific wages and conditions; the National 
Economic Development Council that advised governments, and; Industrial Training Boards 
that coordinated vocational training (Gospel and Edwards, 2012).  
 
EOs’ greater role and representation in the political system triggered consolidation. Most 
importantly, the foundation of the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in 1965 from a 
merger between the Federation of British Industries, the British Employers' Confederation and 
the National Association of British Manufacturers aimed to centralize employer interest 
representation and strengthen their political influence at a time of growing union power (Grant 
and Marsh, 1977). Employer organisation settled into a multi-level structure, characterised by 
large, industry specific national federations, sectoral EOs as well as smaller regional or local 
organisations. Organisations in the latter categories were usually affiliated to national 
federations. Official data are sparse but at the turn of the 1960s, some 1,600 EOs existed, of 
which some 240 were national federations (HMSO, 1961) while the figures were 1,200 and 
300 respectively by 1971 (CIR, 1972, 13).  
 
Assessing EO density as employee proportions by industry is hampered by lack of data, but 
membership bias towards large firms often led to high densities. In 1968 the CBI stated that 
density in ‘major industries’ was ‘80 per cent or more’ and was below 50 per cent ‘in few 
industries’ (HMSO, 1969, 21). More detailed Certification Office data on EO membership were 
available from 1976, when 514 organisations had some 210,000 employer members 
(Certification Office, 1977, 48-49).1   
 
                                                          
1
 Farmers’ Unions removed, as their scale floods members’ data.   
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The state  
 
While collective bargaining followed a voluntarist tradition, governments were supportive, and 
the Ministry of Labour stated that the ‘policy of successive governments’ was to support 
collective dispute resolution arrangements ‘to the fullest extent possible’ (HMSO, 1961, 133). 
Governments also created new tripartite bodies such as the Industrial Training Boards in 1964 
and the National Board for Prices and Incomes in 1965, while it delegated most of the 
Department of Employment’s functions to tripartite bodies in the mid-1970s. 
 
However, the worsening industrial relations climate spurred the government to appoint a Royal 
Commission on Trade Unions and Employers Associations (the ‘Donovan Commission’) 
(HMSO, 1969). The commission found that a primary cause of industrial strife was the 
disconnect between formal multi-level bargaining procedures operated by unions and EOs, and 
informal plant-level agreements between managements and shop stewards (Emmenegger, 
2014). The government could address this disconnect, according to the Commission, by 
creating plant/company-level bargaining and dispute resolution structures (HMSO, 1969). 
Thus, the state made frequent efforts to reduce industrial conflict throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, but with mixed results. The Labour Government’s 1969 ‘In Place of Strife’ White Paper 
aimed to implement most of the Commission’s recommendations but was withdrawn due to 
union and EO pressure (Weekes et al., 1975).  
 
Attempts by the 1970-1974 Conservative Government to create industrial courts to deal with a 
new civil offence of ‘unfair industrial practice’ failed amidst industrial turmoil. The 1974-1979 
Labour Government adopted a more conciliatory stance through its ‘Social Contract’, the high 
point of neo-corporatism in the UK but this collapsed during a wave of strikes at the end of the 
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decade. It was noted that ‘the universal agreement [of the 1950s] on keeping industrial relations 
out of politics has become a hopeless aspiration’ (Crouch, 1978, 106). As part of the 
government’s regulatory intervention within ER, it also acted to deepen the legal status of 
employment. This began with the 1963 Contracts of Employment Act and the subsequent 
introduction of Employment Tribunals. Overall, state intervention was such that Jackson and 
Sisson concluded in 1977 that the post-war behaviour of employers was ‘inextricably bound 
up with the state’ (1977, 315). 
 
Unions 
 
How did unions influence the formation and activities of EOs? Unions were at the apex of their 
post-war influence as membership peaked at 13.3 million people in 1979, a density of 55.4% 
(Howell, 2005, 131). Union influence grew due to a range of factors including: their ability to 
protect members against adverse economic circumstances; the growth of the public sector, and; 
a political and legal environment which often encouraged union membership and incorporated 
union leadership into tripartite decision making.  
 
Growing union influence acted to simultaneously strengthen and weaken EOs. The Trades 
Union Congress’ (TUC) informal political influence grew as it co-ordinated union opposition 
to government incomes and ER policies, with its power entrenched within formal tripartite 
structures by the mid-1970s. Conversely, the unions’ increasing preference for plant-level 
bargaining weakened EOs. Unions often supported such bargaining as it enabled pay rises 
above those mandated by government’s incomes policies. This cemented the plant-level role 
of unions and reduced incentives for employers to join EOs (McKinlay, 2013).  
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Civil Society Organisations 
 
New social movements gained in importance in the UK in the 1960s and 1970s, of which the 
gender and race equality movements were particularly important. An early expression of the 
race equality movement was the 1963 Bristol Bus Boycott that challenged the barring of blacks 
and Asians from employment (Dresser, 1986). The women’s movement focussed on issues 
including equal pay, exemplified by the successful strike action taken in 1968 by female 
machinists at Ford’s Dagenham factory (Clegg, 1979). 
 
Equality movements provided an impetus to government legislation such as the 1965 Race 
Relations Act (and subsequent extensions) and the 1970 Equal Pay Act, as well as the 
government’s creation of the Equal Opportunities Commission and the Commission for Racial 
Equality. Collaborations between equality movements and unions existed such as the campaign 
for equal pay; however, differences remained as union representatives were predominantly 
white and male. Overall, the leadership role of unions within employee representation was 
unchallenged even as other social movements emerged 
 
THE DECLINE OF COLLECTIVE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AND THE 
RECASTING OF EMPLOYER ORGANISATION AND ACTIVITY, 1979-2016 
 
Employer organisation and activity 
 
EOs’ foci transformed as core activities such as collective bargaining decreased in importance 
while once peripheral services and political representation became more important. A 
noticeable shift was within collective bargaining as the proportion of workers in workplaces 
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covered by bargaining fell from 66% in 1984 to 40% in 1998 (Brown et al., 2009, 26). By 2004 
multi-employer collective bargaining covered only three per cent of private sector workplaces 
(Brown et al., 2009, 34) although 68 per cent of the much smaller workforce in the public-
sector retained coverage (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013, 22).   
 
Although over 200 Joint Industrial Councils remained in place in the early 1990s (HMSO, 
1991), many were disused as sixteen national agreements covering over a million workers 
terminated between 1986 and 1991 (Brown and Walsh, 1991). A representative of the 
Chemicals Industry Association (interview, 6.2.2015) noted that: 
 
Years ago (…) we used to have collective bargaining and they used to meet in a little 
restaurant around the corner and the trade unions would argue with the employers over 
a meal and some wine and they’d come to an agreement, but [industry-wide collective 
bargaining is] (…) completely gone.  
 
Such sectoral bargaining generally retained a foothold only in those industries with distinctive 
traditions typically populated by small firms that confronted strong, occupational unions. Even 
within industries where multi-employer bargaining survived, loosening was apparent with joint 
industry board membership made optional for Electrical Contractors Association (ECA) 
members after 2000 (interview with ECA representative, 2.3.15).  
 
Slower decline within the public sector was in part caused by independent pay review bodies, 
consulting (as opposed to negotiating) with EOs as they reviewed pay and conditions. Six 
existed by 2003 covering 1.5 million employees (Horsman, 2003, 229). In addition, EOs and 
unions in the public sector and the not-for-profit private sector increasingly negotiated loose 
non-binding frameworks, although a representative of the Association of Colleges (interview, 
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7.10.2015) pointed to an ‘ebb and flow’ in the number of colleges that followed such 
frameworks. 
 
The most noticeable change was the number of EOs bargaining collectively, declining from 
418 in 1980 to 214 in 1997 and 97 in 2014. While mergers helped total EO membership to 
stabilise in the 1980s, the collapse of national bargaining saw rapid decline thereafter, 
accentuated by structural decline in traditional manufacturing industries where bargaining was 
common (Gooberman, Hauptmeier, and Heery, 2017c). The combined membership of EOs 
recorded by the Certification Office was 223,103 in 1980 and 204,072 in 1989, before declining 
to 146,813 by 1997 and 93,585 in 2014.2 Some organisations emerged to represent newer 
industries or respond to specific demands such as those within the North Sea oil industry 
(Brown and Walsh, 1991), but these were few.  
 
EOs faced a crisis. How could they remain relevant if their roles within bargaining and tripartite 
bodies were scaling down? The answer was diversification as EOs responded to new pressures 
from governments and social movements. EOs that survived were those that created or 
expanded HRM services and lobbying activities. As ER became ‘privatized’ within firms 
(Gospel and Edwards, 2012), EO members sought support to manage workforces through the 
developing practice of HRM (McKinlay, 2011). EOs responded by offering private services 
such as legal support that minimised risks from individual contracts. Increased lobbying of 
government also offered renewal opportunities, with a representative of the Manufacturers’ 
Organisation (EEF) (interview, 4.11.2014) stating that it: 
 
Decided to move into areas where it had dabbled before but never really got involved 
in, which is if you like lobbying representation […] So it started off with very much 
getting involved in representing the interests of manufacturers […] to government, 
                                                          
2
 Farmers’ Unions removed, as their scale floods these data.   
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initially starting quite narrowly looking at just employment issues. Broadening that out 
into what I suppose we would call employment-related issues. Pensions, health and 
safety, education or training. 
 
EOs were increasingly likely to describe themselves as lobbying organisations (interview with 
British Hospitality Association representative, London, 6.2.2015; interview with Chemical 
Industry Association representative, London, 6.2.2015). Territorial differentiation was also 
apparent, with a representative of Dairy Northern Ireland (interview, 3.6.15) discussing the 
importance of lobbying in a devolved political system, featuring governments separate from 
Westminster. 
 
EOs also began to operate in Brussels after the UK’s 1997 accession to the EU’s Social 
Chapter. The changing perspective on Europe was summarised by a former EEF representative:  
 
[The EU] didn’t really feature at all until Labour came to power and decided to sign up 
to the Social Contract […] in 1997 that changed dramatically, and [the] EEF has had 
somebody permanently based out in Brussels since about 2000’ (Interview with EEF 
former representative, 4.11.2014).  
 
Many EOs also expanded legal services, responding to a changing legal environment. For 
example, EEF Northern Ireland developed a greater emphasis on legal services, with a 
representative stating that (interview, 3.6.15):  
 
I would have thought that collective labour law would be less than ten per cent [of ER 
workload] because with the sort of post-Thatcher change in going from collective to 
individual rights, the rights are enforced differently […] The two most likely cases 
you’re going to have are race and age.  
 
The authors’ database reflects the evolution of EO activities, with 73% lobbying governments, 
69% providing training, 47% providing advice linked to employment law and only 13% active 
within collective bargaining.  
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While traditional EOs adapted to new pressures and demands, a new type of employer body 
emerged. EFs responded to new threats and challenges to employer profitability, such as new 
individual rights legislation and consumer expectations of better corporate behaviour, with the 
latter often given more force through CSO campaigns. EFs promoted good corporate practice 
and often encouraged employers to exceed legal standards by: providing guidelines for positive 
work practices; benchmarking member standards; rewarding best practice at award 
ceremonies, and; providing training. Most EFs focused on disadvantaged or vulnerable groups 
of employees, such as those with: disabilities (Business Disability Forum [BDF]); caring 
responsibilities (Employer for Carers); experience of domestic violence (Corporate Alliance 
Against Domestic Violence), and; mental health conditions (Mindful Employer).   
 
EFs promoted membership through a business case, arguing that they could protect members 
against legal risks, increase members’ productivity by adjusting work practices, and enhance 
brand reputation. Member firms voluntarily adhered to EF standards without fines or 
disciplinary measures. Traditional EOs and EFs both assisted employers but used different 
techniques. While traditional EOs focused on assisting employers with legal compliance, EFs 
sought to raise standards within employers by promoting voluntary best practice approaches 
that often exceeded legal requirements. Seven were founded after 2003 and 10 national EFs 
existed by 2016 (Demougin, Gooberman, Hauptmeier, and Heery, 2017; Bowkett C, 
Hauptmeier, and Heery, 2017). While they were few in numbers, their reach was broad as 
demonstrated by the BDF’s coverage of 20% of the UK’s workforce. EFs’ members tended to 
be large businesses when compared to typical UK firms: ‘over a hundred [of our members] are 
multinationals’ (BDF, Director of strategy and external affairs, 11.8.2016).  
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The state 
 
The election of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher saw a sea change in British ER. According 
to David Young, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry: ‘We gave up the TUC, we gave up 
the CBI, we do not see them coming up again. We gave up the corporate state’ (Financial 
Times, 1988). The government saw bargaining as establishing rigid wage rates that hampered 
job creation (Brown and Walsh, 1991). It thus lobbied EOs and was outspoken in opposing 
multi-employer bargaining from the late 1980s, although it did not legislate (Interview with 
EEF representative, London, 4.11.2014). As well as this, successive governments’ curtailment 
of collective labour rights weakened unions while the end of incomes policies undermined 
collective bargaining.  
 
However, the 1990s saw a lessening pace of change as the Conservative Governments had 
already achieved many of their main objectives within ER, while European Directives reduced 
the government’s freedom of manoeuvre (Emmenegger, 2014). Some expansion of individual 
rights occurred such as the 1995 Disability Discrimination Act, although an opt-out to the EU’s 
Social Chapter was negotiated in 1992. Finally, Conservative Governments in the 1980s and 
1990s abolished tripartite structures such as the National Economic Development Council and 
almost all of the wages councils. Industrial Training Boards were replaced with a tripartite 
Manpower Services Commission, supplanted in 1987 by Training and Enterprise Councils, 
with a governance role for individual employers but not EOs, while EOs maintained a role in 
the joint governance of health and safety (Health and Safety Executive) and conflict (ACAS).   
 
Labour Governments after 1997 retained the neoliberal character of post-1979 ER although 
some change was apparent. First, it created a small number of tripartite bodies, including a Low 
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Pay Commission to regulate the newly introduced minimum wage. Second, the Government’s 
decision to join the EU’s Social Chapter led to some extension of workplace rights across 
European Works Councils, parental leave, part-time work and fixed-term contracts. Finally, 
the government created the Equality and Human Rights Commission in 2006 through merging 
existing commissions covering gender, disability and race equality (Dickens, 2007). Its review 
of equality legislation resulted in the Equality Act 2010 (passed under the incoming 
Conservative-Liberal Government), which set out comprehensive workplace rights and duties 
for individuals. Although the Labour Government broadly accepted the contours of post-1979 
ER in relation to collective issues, it was not uncritical and some new legislation was 
introduced. These included a statutory union recognition procedure and other defences for trade 
unions such as new laws on strikes and protections against blacklisting.  
 
The Conservative-led Governments from 2010-2016 saw a partial return to previous themes, 
including restrictive union legislation and the weakening of individual rights such as extending 
the qualifying period for the right to claim unfair dismissal. Further diminution of ER structures 
was apparent as tripartite boards were increasingly likely to be comprised of independent 
experts as opposed to EO or union representatives (Email correspondence with former Acas 
and Low Pay Commission board member, 4.9.2016). However, devolution did lead to some 
territorial divergences with, for example, the government’s abolition of the England and Wales 
Agricultural Wages Board in 2013 opposed successfully in Wales by the Welsh Government.  
 
Unions 
 
How influential were unions on the evolution of EOs? Unions underwent a series of shocks 
throughout the 1980s that reduced their bargaining power and membership. By the end of the 
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1990s only 24% of private sector employers with more than 25 employees recognised unions, 
compared to 87% in the public sector (Brown, Bryson and Forth, 2009, 24). Union influence 
declined with the Civil and Public Services Association complaining in 1994 that unions ‘have 
not had a scintilla of influence over government policies’ (Taylor, 2000, 257). Overall, unions 
were generally powerless to resist the decline of collective bargaining. For example, after the 
abolition of the wages council covering working men’s clubs, the union and EO negotiated an 
industry agreement but this faded over time (Interview with Unite representative, 28.08.2015).  
 
While unions sought to renew themselves after 1997, they did not rebuild relationships with 
EOs. However, some formal and informal relationships remained. For the TUC, formal 
relationships existed through tripartite bodies such as the Low Pay Commission and regional 
bodies such as Local Enterprise Boards. Informal relationships included contact at a senior 
level between the TUC and EOs over a range of workplace issues (Interview with TUC 
representative, 13.03.2015). However, relationships were more distant elsewhere in the 
absence of government encouragement or the existence of institutional forums, with a 
representative of Unite remarking on the ‘uneasy’ relationship with the UK Homecare 
Association, given persistent employment problems in the care industry (Interview with Unite 
representative, 26.08.2015). 
 
Civil Society Organisations 
 
The influence of CSOs increased as union power declined. CSOs often acted in effect as 
institutions of worker representation, seeking to improve the conditions experienced by their 
worker constituents. Fieldwork carried out in 2007-2008 (Heery, Abbott and Williams, 2012) 
identified 422 CSOs attempting to influence some aspects of ER, with most founded since the 
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1980s. CSO activity increased as an agenda emerged within governments, in particular under 
Labour, to widen participation in the labour market through reducing barriers faced by 
disadvantaged groups.  
 
CSOs acted across four broad areas: discrimination and equality (e.g. Age UK, Stonewall), 
legal advice and advocacy (e.g. Law Works), caring and work life issues (e.g. Carers UK) and 
vulnerable workers (e.g. Citizens Organising Foundation). CSOs pursued their agenda in the 
following ways. First, CSOs promoted legislative change as, for example, Stonewall 
campaigned for the adoption of the EU’s Equal Framework Directive, which was transposed 
into UK regulations in 2003; while Carers UK campaigned for provisions in the Carers’ Equal 
Opportunities Act introduced in 2004 (interview Carers UK, 2.3.15). As well as lobbying, 
CSOs were involved in the legislative process, such as appearing before parliamentary 
committees or assisting the drafting of legislation. 
 
Second, CSOs used existing legislation to pursue employers, for example Stonewall supported 
cases that targeted discrimination at work while Age Concern successfully challenged 
discrimination against older workers. Such strategic litigation contributed to the effectiveness 
of existing laws, raised awareness about new legal norms amongst employers and contributed 
to the development of case law.  
 
Third, CSOs received grants and contracts offered by governments to support its legislative 
agenda and targeted groups, acting to strengthen legislation or codes of conduct that operated 
within their policy domains. As examples, Age Concern delivered training programmes for 
older job seekers to disseminate the code on age diversity and The Age and Employment 
Network won government contracts to run seminars on new employment regulation 
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(Demougin, Gooberman, Hauptmeier, and Heery, 2017; Bowkett C, Hauptmeier, and Heery, 
2017).  
 
Fourth, CSOs and related advocacy groups directly targeted individual companies through 
campaigns to raise standards. A recent example has been local living wage campaigns against 
individual companies initiated by employee or community groups in collaboration with the 
Living Wage Foundation. In the same vein, identity groups within the workplace sought to 
advance the cause of their constituents in collaboration with CSOs such as Stonewall. In the 
UK, corporate campaigns mostly struck a positive tone, gently encouraging employers to raise 
standards in contrast to the USA where advocacy groups often deployed more aggressive 
tactics.  
 
Fifth, many CSOs offered remedies for employers targeted by campaigns. Alternatively, 
employers collaborated with CSOs to pre-empt campaigns and raise labour standards. While 
such collaboration was often carried out by individual employers, CSOs were active in creating 
some employer forums, such as Employers for Carers. CSOs themselves offered accreditation, 
codes of conducts, benchmarking or the use of their logo to employers. For example, employers 
who implemented the standards of the Living Wage Foundation could be accredited as a Living 
Wage Employer. In addition, CSOs promoted best cases of corporate social responsibility or 
honoured outstanding companies at award ceremonies. Both the recognition by CSOs as well 
as the accreditation could be used by companies to promote themselves to consumers and the 
workforce as a good company to buy from or to work for.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
This article has sought to explain the evolution of UK EOs from the 1960s to 2016, as 
summarised in table 2. 
Table 2 about here  
 
In the first period, collective employer representation took place through place through national 
federations as well as sectoral, regional and local EOs. Industry bargaining was conducted on 
the employers’ side by national EOs and covered much of the workforce. Throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s, EOs were drawn into the management of the economy as social partners while they 
represented their employer members on tripartite bodies (Crouch, 1978). Institutional stability, 
however, masked underlying weakness. In much of the private sector enterprise and workplace 
bargaining had grown, hollowing out multi-employer, industry agreements. Institutional 
weakness was exposed after 1979 as multi-employer bargaining through EOs largely 
disappeared from the private sector. In the public sector, multi-employer bargaining survived 
but was supplemented by the extension of the Pay Review Body system. A final indicator of 
decline was the abolition of many of the tripartite structures upon which EOs were represented. 
Representative bodies of business were pushed to the margins of policy making by a more 
assertive, unilateral mode of government. 
 
These lineaments of decline have been identified elsewhere (Brown and Walsh 1991; Purcell 
1995) and form part of the common meta-narrative of industrial relations change within the 
UK. Less commonly identified, however, have been changes in EOs’ nature and form. Our 
evidence indicates that political activity has become more important for EOs at UK, European 
and, latterly, devolved government levels. The regulatory impulses of the state operated across 
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these scales to elicit a response from EOs which increasingly functioned as lobbyists. Another 
expanding activity has been advisory and advocacy work on behalf of individual members. 
From the 1980s EOs often played an important role in facilitating HRM within member 
companies. EOs’ services have focused on managing the relationship between businesses and 
the expanded realm of employment law, such as advising members on legal compliance and 
providing representation in courts and tribunals. 
 
A key change in the form of EOs in this second period was the emergence of issue-based 
employer bodies, EFs. These promoted good practice across CSR and equality amongst 
member businesses (Demougin, Gooberman, Hauptmeier and Heery, 2017; Bowkett C, 
Hauptmeier, and Heery, 2017). EFs promoted good practice in HRM to member companies 
and sought to upgrade issue-based forms of management through education, training, 
consultancy and advice. EFs first emerged in the mid-1980s before growing in number and in 
influence, and were notable for their almost complete detachment from the traditional system 
of union-based ER. 
 
What forces have driven these developments? In answering this question we used previous 
concepts of countervailing power (Barry and Wilkinson, 2011; Galbraith, 1952; Zhu and 
Nyland, 2016) but extended them through three arguments. First, change is a product of the 
absolute and relative decline of unionism. The requirement for EOs to function as a 
counterweight to unions has been felt less urgently since the 1970s. Second, developments have 
been driven by the activities of the state. The decline of unionism and associated dismantling 
of multi-employer industrial relations were largely artefacts of state policy. At the same time, 
however, state intervention in the individual ER expanded and employment law grew, often 
originating in the EU’s social policy. A more active regulatory state has presented EOs with 
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fresh opportunities to act as a buffering mechanism, lobbying government to secure favourable 
changes in the law and mediating the impact of law on member firms through expanded 
advisory and advocacy services. Associated with this increased volume of individual 
employment law were consultative bodies, such as the Low Pay Commission, which played an 
important role in the regulatory framework and provided fresh opportunities for employer 
representation. 
 
The final stimulus to change has come from ‘new’ social movements, grounded in non-work 
identities, such as disability, gender, ethnicity, and caring responsibility (Heery, Abbott and 
Williams, 2012; Piore and Safford, 2006). CSOs representing these movements targeted 
employers directly to shape management practices, and indirectly impacted on traditional EOs 
through the law. Where there has been direct contact with employer bodies has been with the 
EFs, which were in many respects a business-specific expression of these movements. The 
influence here was more direct than was the case for other EOs. In addition, CSOs played a 
large part in creating the new rights-based employment law regime, reinforcing pressures from 
the state. As the ‘old’ social movement of labour declined, new movements have partly taken 
its place. The concrete organisational expression of this shift in the locus of pressure on 
employers was the creation of EFs. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The article contributes to the literature on countervailing power in ER, which aims to explain 
EO formation and behaviour. Early arguments focussed on the power of unions, to which 
employers responded by organizing collectively in EOs and developing capabilities to 
countervail union power (Phelps Brown, 1959; Slate, 1957; Sisson, 1987). Recent extensions 
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of the countervailing power argument considered the role of the state in the context of 
competitive markets and decentralized collective bargaining structures (Barry and Wilkinson, 
2011), in which employers lobbied the state to curtail union power. This form of political 
intervention, whereby EOs moved beyond a narrower labour market role, could be observed in 
different countries (Blyth, 2002; Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 1999).  
 
Our argument adds to this literature by specifying two extensions to which countervailing 
employer action is needed, although we acknowledge the continuing influence of unions. Our 
first extension considers a further role of the state to the one identified by Barry and Wilkinson 
(2011). As bargaining declined, states sought a less collective and more ‘flexible’ form of 
labour market regulation and focussed on individual rights, advancing equal opportunities and 
minimum standards at work. Our second extension refers to CSOs active in work and 
employment who seek to advance the interests of groups of workers. CSOs do this by lobbying 
for the introduction of new law, playing a role in the formulation of law before subsequently 
mobilising these to improve standards at work (Piore and Safford, 2006; Heery, Abbott, and 
Williams, 2012). In sum, while union power diminished, pressures by new individual rights 
and CSOs became more prevalent. We argue that this shift in challenges helps to explain the 
changing role of EOs from a narrow labour market role focussed on collective bargaining to a 
greater diversity of activities, including political representation, extending legal provision, 
developing private and voluntary regulation (Heery, Abbott and Williams, 2012) as well as 
founding of new types of EOs such as EFs. 
 
Changes of employer organisation and activities are not unique to the UK and similar evolution 
has been observed elsewhere (Martin and Swank, 2012). However, our argument differs from 
other accounts. Alternative arguments emphasize the provision of new selective incentives and 
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the role of institutional entrepreneurs, which helped EOs to adapt and survive when their 
previous core competency, negotiating collective bargaining agreements, was less in demand 
by individual employers (Sheldon et al., 2016; Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 2004; Behrens 
2004). At first sight, these seem to be directly competing arguments. Countervailing power 
arguments tend to jointly consider individual employers and EOs, focussing on the 
identification of external pressures on employers, while selective goods arguments provide a 
more fine-grained account of the motives underlying the interactions between individual 
employers and EOs but do less in specifying the external environment. In our view, a 
complementary interpretation of these two sets of arguments is possible. In response to new 
pressures and challenges on individual employers, which the countervailing power literature 
specifies, institutional entrepreneurs within EOs interpret these challenges and respond to them 
by providing new selective incentives that are needed by individual employers and help them 
to adapt to a changing external environment, which in turn secures the survival of EOs.  
 
Another competing argument places a greater emphasis on institutions of collective bargaining 
in maintaining EOs, arguing that it is not so much union power but the collective bargaining 
machinery that sustains EOs (Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 1999; Behrens 2004; Silvia and 
Schroeder, 2007). While we recognise that bargaining institutions contribute to some inertia, 
we argue that there is some correspondence between union power and the incidence of 
collective bargaining in a voluntarist ER system such as that of the UK. The role of institutions 
and related inertia might play a greater role in sustaining EOs in coordinated market economies, 
where extension rules extend collective bargaining coverage and guarantee broad coverage 
even in a context of lower union density.  
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This discussion highlights that our argument needs to be tested in other countries, to establish 
whether it more broadly explains change in collective employer behaviour, requires 
refinements or the identification of additional extensions and pressures in other contexts. For 
example, research focusing on post-communist Eastern Europe (Markus, 2008; Duvanova, 
2007) argued that EOs were formed as defensive mechanisms to protect business against state-
sponsored corruption and regulation. In the case of liberal market economies, it seems possible 
that individual rights are more significant, while coordinated market economies might continue 
to have a greater reliance on setting work standards through collective regulation. However, 
these and other cross-national variation will have to be empirically and theoretically 
substantiated in future research.  
 
In conclusion, the concept of countervailing power continues to display utility and can guide 
the analysis of the changing forms and activity of employer collective action. We have 
identified three types of power to which a counter-balance is needed, with the state and new 
social movements joining the labour movement. The empirical pattern we have described has 
emerged from the decline of the latter and the rise in significance of the former. Organized 
labour continues to pressure employers to act collectively and to associate, but its force is 
weakened. The state and other, non-labour movements which target the employment 
relationship, have correspondingly risen in importance. 
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Table 1: Governments of the United Kingdom, 1957-2016 
 
Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/history/past-prime-ministers [accessed on 14 
February 2018] 
 
Table 2: Evolution of Employers’ Organisation and Determining Factors, 1960s to 2016  
          
    1960s to 1979   1979 - 2016 
    
      
EO Activity   Focus on collective bargaining and 
tripartite structures. 
  Decline in participation within 
collective bargaining and tripartite 
bodies. Political representation, legal 
provisions and private, voluntary 
regulation increasing in importance. 
  
        
EO 
Organisation/ 
structure 
  Multi-level structure: National 
federations and sectoral, regional and 
local EOs 
  Collapse of many national federations; 
instead greater prevalence of sectoral 
EOs. Growth of Employer Forums and 
EOs solely active in devolved nations. 
Expanding employer representation in 
the EU.  
  
        
Role of the 
state 
  Supportive of collective bargaining 
but increasing emphasis on plant level 
agreements. Attempts to reform ER, 
and the creation and maintenance of 
tripartite structures. 
  Informal pressure to abandon collective 
bargaining, abolition of some tripartite 
bodies and curtailing of unions' 
discretionary power in the 1980s and 
1990s. Increasing focus on individual 
rights throughout, especially after 1997. 
Some consultative bodies established 
after 1997. 
  
        
Role of 
unions 
  Levels of strikes and whipsawing 
gradually increasing. Active within 
tripartite structures. Union 
membership peaks in 1970s.  
  Heightened conflict in the early 1980s, 
fewer strikes and less participation in 
tripartite bodies thereafter. Declining 
influence.  
  
        
Years Governing Parties Prime Ministers 
1957 – 1964 Conservative Harold Macmillan, Alec Douglas-Home
1964 – 1970 Labour Harold Wilson 
1970 – 1974 Conservative Edward Heath
1974 – 1979 Labour Harold Wilson, James Callaghan
1979 – 1997 Conservative Margaret Thatcher, John Major
1997 – 2010 Labour Tony Blair, Gordon Brown
2010 – 2015 Conservative & Liberal Democrats David Cameron 
2015 – 2016 Conservative David Cameron 
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Role of civil 
society 
organisations 
  Gradually emerging, but limited in 
their volume and influence. 
  Increasing scale, profile and influence 
within the workplace. Greater use of 
campaigning, targeting the state and 
individual employers.  
          
          
 
Source: authors’ analysis  
